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Charitable Contributions of Services: 
Charitable Gift Planning for Nonitemizers
HENRY ORDOWER*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the tax treatment of charitable contributions and 
concludes that contributors who do not itemize their deductions (nonitemiz-
ers) should contribute their services to charity whenever possible rather than 
contributing cash or property. Charitable donees similarly should embrace 
opportunities to accept and utilize service contributions from their donor 
bases, give service contributions as much recognition as money or property 
contributions, and encourage their lower-income donors to render services 
rather than giving money earned with performance of services. The Article 
suggests that nonitemizing taxpayers are the donors who have the most “skin 
in the game” for charitable contributions in terms of sacrifice. Promoting ser-
vice rather than money or property contributions maximizes the tax subsidy 
of the charitable contributions. From the perspective of efficient tax planning 
for low and moderate-income taxpayers, the tradition of volunteerism in the 
United States is compelling. Yet, despite the ability to get more “bang for the 
buck” from service contributions, many charitable organizations that used 
to rely on volunteers for support increasingly have shifted their operations 
to reliance on paid staff and pushed even the low-income members of their 
donor base to contribute money rather than volunteer services.
I.  Introduction
This Article recommends renewed emphasis on service contributions to 
charity for taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions for federal income 
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1967; The University of Chicago, M.A., 1970; J.D., 1975. The author thanks Jason Finkes, 
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tance, Ilene Ordower for proofreading and textual assistance, the attendees at the Critical Tax 
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tax purposes.1 Despite proposals to offer a charitable contribution deduction 
for certain service contributions, this Article does not argue that any taxpay-
ers, whether physicians or other skilled workers, should receive a contribution 
deduction for the value of their services unless they include the value of the 
services in income and claim an offsetting deduction.2 Service contributions 
currently provide contributors, especially lower-income contributors who 
do not itemize their deductions, a more substantial tax benefit than do cash 
and property contributions by not imputing income from the performance 
of those volunteer services in the donor’s gross income.3 Promoting service, 
rather than money or property, contributions helps maximize the tax subsidy 
accompanying charitable contributions and redirects revenues from govern-
mental to nongovernmental, charitable activities. From the perspective of 
efficient tax planning for low and moderate-income taxpayers, the tradition 
of volunteerism in the United States is compelling. Yet, despite the systemic 
tax advantages of service contributions, many charitable organizations that 
used to rely on volunteers for operational support have shifted to reliance on 
paid staff.4
Part II of this Article illustrates the basic tax treatment of charitable con-
tributions and distinguishes the charitable contribution deduction from the 
charitable exclusion of gain and service income. Part III seeks to quantify the 
combined effect of the charitable deduction and gain exclusion and compares 
that effect with the services exclusion. Part IV addresses the income split-
ting or shifting function of charitable contributions and seeks to understand 
the denial of the charitable contribution deduction to taxpayers who do not 
itemize deductions. Part V discusses the issue of sacrifice inherent in the con-
text of charitable giving. Part VI looks more closely at imputation of service 
1 I.R.C. § 63. Section references are to the 1986 Code, as amended, unless otherwise 
noted. Section 63 allows individual taxpayers to deduct from their adjusted gross incomes, 
as determined under section 62 (and defined as gross income under section 61 less specified 
deductions), either a standard deduction amount or the amount of the individual’s itemized 
deductions. Taxable income is adjusted gross income less personal exemptions under section 
151 and less the standard deduction or itemized deductions. Section 1 computes an individu-
al’s tax liability on the taxable income. Itemizers are those individual taxpayers whose itemized 
deductions exceed in amount the standard deduction, as well as some taxpayers whom the 
Code requires to itemize deductions. The charitable contribution deduction under section 170 
is one of the itemized deductions.
2 Charity Care Tax Deduction for Physicians Act of 2012, H.R. 5849, 112th Cong. (pro-
posing a deduction for physicians offering charity care but proposal did not come out of 
committee); see, e.g., Alice M. Thomas, Re-Envisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate 
Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sustained 
Volunteerism, 19 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 269 (2010) (proposing an imputed charitable con-
tribution deduction or credit for volunteer services).
3 This Article refers to nonimputation as a charitable exclusion. See infra Part II.B.2.
4 See Mark A. Musick & John Wilson, Volunteers: A Social Profile 397 (2007) (dis-
cussing how volunteering is changing by group and activity—trending towards low-income 
young adults and elderly volunteering in sporadic affiliations managed by a paid staff, with 
more tending to volunteer with government agencies).
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income and, specifically, the charitable exclusion for contributions of services. 
Part VII concludes that charitable organizations should revisit their approach 
to service contributions by returning to volunteerism to capture additional 
implicit government tax subsidies for charities and their donors.
II.  Charitable Contribution Tax Benefits
A.  The Charitable Deduction
Among individual charitable donors of cash or property are (1) some who 
itemize their deductions for federal income tax purposes5 and get a federal 
income tax benefit by deducting their contributions;6 (2) some taxpayers who 
itemize their deductions but get only a partial current federal income tax 
deduction from their contributions because their contributions exceed certain 
percentages7 of their adjusted gross income to which deductible contributions 
are limited;8 and (3) some taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions for 
federal income tax purposes and, accordingly, receive no income tax deduc-
tion from their contributions at all.9
To the extent that the charitable contribution deduction reduces the tax-
payer’s income, the deduction’s impact begins at the taxpayer’s greatest mar-
ginal rate of tax and works its way down through the taxpayer’s marginal 
brackets as it reduces the taxpayer’s taxable income.10 Similarly, most states 
that impose a tax on incomes also allow a deduction for gifts to charity that 
begins at the taxpayer’s highest state income tax bracket and works its way 
5 See supra note 1.
6 I.R.C. § 170 (allowing a deduction for contributions to charity).
7 § 170(b) (limiting the current deductibility of charitable contributions to 50% or less of 
the individual taxpayer’s contribution base, defined in section 170(b)(1)(G) as adjusted gross 
income computed without regard to any net operating loss carryback). For a discussion of 
these limitations and their function, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault? Fair 
Shares and Charitable Giving, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 165 (2008).
8 § 170(d) (allowing a carryover of contribution amounts exceeding section 170(b) limita-
tions to the next five taxable years).
9 Under section 63, the standard deduction amount does not vary with the amount, if any, 
of the taxpayer’s charitable gifts. See I.R.C. § 63.
10 See I.R.C. § 1 (imposing a tax upon the taxable income of each individual or trust taxable 
at marginal rates ranging from 15% (or zero percent if one includes those whose incomes fall 
below the first marginal bracket threshold) to 39.6% of the taxpayer’s taxable income subject 
to that marginal bracket). See generally the reform proposals in Roger Colinvaux, Brian 
Galle & Eugene Steuerle, Urban Institute, Evaluating the Charitable Deduction 
and Proposed Reforms (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412586-
Evaluating-the-Charitable-Deduction-and-Proposed-Reforms.pdf.
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down any marginal brackets the state may have.11 To illustrate this point, 
assume an individual taxpayer makes a $100 deductible contribution. Absent 
the contribution, $50 of the taxpayer’s income would be subject to the 39.6% 
federal rate of tax and the maximum state rate of tax of eight percent in a state 
having marginal brackets matching the federal marginal income tax brackets 
but using rates of zero, two, four, six, and eight percent. The taxpayer will 
reduce her federal income tax liability by $37.80, which is 39.6% of $50 plus 
36% of $50 since only $50 of the contribution reduces tax at the maximum 
rate. The taxpayer will also reduce her tax liability by $7 at the state level, that 
is eight percent of the $50 taxed at the maximum rate and six percent of the 
remainder taxed at the six percent state rate. Since state taxes are deductible 
in computing the federal income tax,12 the taxpayer’s state tax savings reduces 
that deduction by the $7 state tax savings and increases the federal income 
tax by $2.52 (36% of $7) for a net federal income tax savings of $35.28 plus 
the $7 state tax savings for a total of $42.28 combined tax savings.13 As a 
result of the deduction effect, the value of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion increases to the maximum marginal rate of tax as the taxpayer’s income 
increases.14
In the example in the previous paragraph, the net cost to the taxpayer of 
her $100 charitable contribution is $57.72, which is $100 less the federal 
tax reduction of $35.28 plus $7 state tax reduction ($55.58 under the same 
assumptions at maximum state and federal rates15). For a nonitemizer, the tax 
11 For example, the author’s home state of Missouri uses federal adjusted gross income and 
federal itemized deductions, both with various adjustments, as its base for tax computations. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.141 (2011) (itemized deductions); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.121 (2011). 
Nonitemizers in those states get no tax benefit from the charitable deduction unless they 
qualify for one or more of the targeted tax credits for certain charitable gifts some states like 
Missouri offer. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. Credits generally are a function of 
the amount of the contribution and do not vary with the donor’s marginal rates of tax but 
may be nonrefundable, so that the credit is of no value once it exceeds in amount the donor’s 
liability for tax.
12 I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (allowing a deduction for state income taxes).
13 The computation may not be quite as straightforward as the example shows. Some states 
may allow a deduction for federal income taxes in computing state income tax liability. More 
significantly, the taxpayer may lose some or all the state income tax deduction in computing her 
federal income tax liability because of the alternative minimum tax under section 55. See I.R.C. 
§ 55. This example and other examples in this Article do not illustrate the effect of the alternative 
minimum tax. The alternative minimum tax enhances the net value of the charitable contribu-
tion deduction because the alternative minimum tax does not allow a deduction for state income 
taxes but does allow the deduction for charitable contributions. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1).
14 In the example in the text, if the taxpayer had at least $100 of income otherwise subject to 
the maximum federal and state rates, her federal savings would be $39.60 plus $8 state savings 
or $47.60 (less the state tax deduction effect of $3.17).
15 That is if the full amount of the contribution offsets income otherwise taxable at the 
39.6% federal and eight percent state rates.
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savings from the same charitable contribution is zero and the net cost of the 
contribution is $100.16
Taxpayers who itemize and make their contributions in the form of appre-
ciated property, rather than cash, enjoy a deduction amount from the con-
tribution of property to charity generally equal to the fair market value of 
the property on the date of the contribution,17 rather than the taxpayer’s cost 
of or adjusted tax basis in the property.18 For example, if a taxpayer contrib-
utes a rare coin that she purchased for $10 and the coin has a value of $100 
at the moment of contribution, the deduction is $100, not the taxpayer’s 
original investment amount. Compare the rule for losses that limits the loss 
deduction to the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the loss property even if the 
property is destroyed.19 While several provisions limit the deduction amount 
to the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the contributed property,20 most appre-
ciated investment property yields a fair market value deduction. Whether 
cash or appreciated property, the contribution base limits21 are a function of 
the donor’s adjusted gross income and restrict current deductibility in some 
instances. Those limits have lower thresholds, however, for appreciated prop-
erty contributions.22
B.  The Charitable Exclusions
Supplementing the charitable contribution deduction in the case of con-
tribution of appreciated property is the exclusion of gain on the contributed 
property from the contributor’s gross income. Contribution of appreciated 
16 There may be unusual circumstances under which a nonitemizer is subject to the alterna-
tive minimum tax and is not allowed the standard deduction or personal exemptions in com-
puting that tax. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(E) (disallowing the deduction for the standard deduction 
and personal exemptions in computing the alternative minimum tax). The charitable contri-
bution deduction would be allowable and may result in someone, otherwise a nonitemizer, 
electing to itemize deductions. I.R.C. § 63(e) (election to itemize deductions).
17 Section 170(c) defines charitable contribution but does not measure it. Regulation section 
1.170-1(c)(1) interprets section 170 with respect to property and uses fair market value as the 
measure of the amount of a property contribution.
18 Under section 1012 (defining basis to equal cost), the taxpayer’s cost often is the taxpayer’s 
basis in the property. That basis may adjust for allowances such as depreciation under section 
1016(a)(2), for example, so that the taxpayer’s adjusted basis under section 1011(a) is less than 
the taxpayer’s cost. Gain the taxpayer realizes and recognizes on the sale of the property is the 
amount realized from the sale less the taxpayer’s adjusted basis rather than cost. I.R.C. § 1001 
(determining gain from the sale or other disposition of property).
19 I.R.C. § 165(b) (amount of loss deduction).
20 For example, section 170(e)(1)(A) limits the deduction to adjusted basis to the extent gain 
on sale of contributed property would be not be long term capital, and section 170(e)(1)(B)
(i) limits the deduction to adjusted basis for gifts of tangible property unrelated to the charity’s 
purpose. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A)-(B).
21 § 170(b) (limiting the charitable contribution deduction to specific percentages of the 
taxpayer’s contribution base); see also supra text accompanying note 6.
22 § 170(b)(1)(C), (D) (contribution base limitations for capital gain property); see also 
Fleischer, supra note 7, at 223 (recommending lower contribution base limits for additionally 
subsidized gifts of appreciated property).
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property does not trigger the recognition of the donor’s gain on the prop-
erty despite the donor’s disposition of the property.23 Similarly, rendition 
of services to a charity does not result in the donor including the value of 
the services in her income.24 This Article refers to the failure of the income 
tax system to impute gain to the contributor of property and the failure to 
impute income to the contributor of services as the charitable exclusions.
1.  Gain
When the taxpayer contributes appreciated property, she permanently 
excludes the appreciation from her income.25 While this outcome resembles 
the outcome accompanying a noncharitable gift, a noncharitable gift defers 
the realization and recognition of gain and shifts the burden of the poten-
tial gain to the donee. The donee in the case of a noncharitable gift takes 
the donor’s adjusted basis in the gift property.26 Accordingly, the donee may 
become taxable on the gain accruing during the donor’s ownership (and the 
ownership of previous donors) when the donee sells the appreciated property. 
Because the charitable donee is exempt from tax,27 the donor’s potential gain 
disappears. The charity is not taxable on the historical gain (or gain during 
the charitable donee’s holding period).
The charitable exclusion results from the failure of the income tax to impute 
taxable gain to the contributing taxpayer from the appreciated property at 
any time—not upon contribution and not upon sale of the property by the 
charity.28 The charitable exclusion applies29 whether the taxpayer’s gain on sale 
would have been ordinary or capital30 and even if the property is unrelated 
23 Section 1001(a) measures realized gain as the excess of the proceeds the taxpayer receives 
over the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property. Since the contribution is a gift, there is no 
exchange of property for consideration so that the statute is inapplicable. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
24 A donor of services receives nothing in exchange for the services and need not include 
any amount in her income. See I.R.C. § 83 (requiring the receipt of something in exchange 
for the services in order for an inclusion in income); Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (excluding the value of 
contributed services from the service provider’s gross income, but not services provided to a 
third party with payment to the charitable organization).
25 Under section 1001, no realization of gain occurs. See I.R.C. § 1001.
26 I.R.C. § 1015 (requiring that the donee take the donor’s basis in the case of a gift, with 
exceptions for depreciated property).
27 I.R.C. § 501(a) (establishing that charities are exempt from tax on income, with exceptions).
28 Compare, for example, section 311(b), imputing a sale at fair market value when a cor-
poration distributes appreciated property to its shareholders. Before 1986, such a distribution 
would not have been taxable to the corporation under section 311(a). I.R.C. § 311.
29 I.R.C. § 1245(b)(1) (requiring recapture of depreciation, notwithstanding other Code 
provisions, and including an internal exception to recapture for gifts); Boris I. Bittker et al., 
Federal Income Taxation of Individuals ¶ 28.03 (2d ed. 2013)(observing “the assumption 
that a gift is not a taxable event”).
30 See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (limiting the deduction to adjusted basis if gain would not be 
capital on sale).
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to the charitable purpose.31 Even if the charity sells the contributed property 
immediately following the contribution, neither the contributing taxpayer 
nor the charity recognizes gain on the contribution or from the contribu-
tion32 unless the taxpayer committed to sell the property and contributed it 
subject to the obligation to sell.33 Similarly, the charitable exclusion is not 
subject to the contribution base limitations. Only if the charity assumes, or 
takes subject to, indebtedness encumbering the contributed property will the 
charitable gift become part sale to the extent of the debt and part gift to the 
extent of the excess of the fair market value of the property over the amount 
of the debt.34 In that instance, the donor must allocate her adjusted basis in 
the property between the sale portion and the gift portion relative to their 
respective amounts to determine how much gain the taxpayer recognizes on 
the part sale portion of the transfer of the property to charity.35
The charitable exclusion benefit from contributing appreciated property 
supplements and sometimes exceeds the tax benefit from the charitable 
deduction. For example, a donor, otherwise taxable at the maximum federal 
income tax rate chooses to contribute $100 to charity. If the donor makes the 
contribution in cash (considering federal income tax only), the net cost of the 
contribution is $60.4036 assuming the donor does not run afoul of any con-
tribution limit and otherwise itemizes deductions. If the donor contributes 
ordinary gain property to charity with an adjusted basis of $10 and the fair 
market value of $100, the charitable contribution deduction has a value to the 
donor of $3.96, that is, 39.6% of the donor’s adjusted basis.37 The charitable 
exclusion, however, has a value of $35.64, that is, 39.6% of the avoided $90 
of ordinary income from the sale of the property. In that instance, the value of 
the exclusion exceeds the value of the deduction, and the overall result is iden-
tical to a cash contribution without any concern about contribution limits or 
itemized deduction limitations. While the gain exclusion is available equally 
to itemizing and nonitemizing taxpayers, as a class, nonitemizing taxpayers 
31 § 170(e)(1)(B) (limiting the deduction for tangible personal property unrelated to the 
charity’s charitable purpose).
32 For vehicle, boat, and airplane contributions, the charity’s sale price is the ceiling on the 
amount of the taxpayer’s deduction. § 170(f )(12)(A)(ii). Likewise, if the charity sells property 
related to its exempt purpose within three years of the contribution of that property, the donor 
must recapture that portion of the contribution amount exceeding the donor’s adjusted basis 
in the contributed property. § 170(e)(7).
33 Palmer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 684 (1974), acq. 1978-1 C.B. 83 (holding that the 
donor of appreciated securities is taxable on the gain from a subsequent redemption only if 
there was a binding commitment to redeem at the time of the gift).
34 Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (treating relief of debt as amount realized).
35 See I.R.C. § 1011(b) (allocating basis between the sale and gift portions of a bargain sale 
to charity).
36 The $100 charitable contribution deduction yields a tax benefit of $39.60 tax savings, 
leaving the net cost at $60.40.
37 See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (limiting the deduction to the donor’s basis).
132085_TTL_Spring 2014.indb   523 6/5/14   11:07 AM
524 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3
are far less likely to own appreciated property that they may contribute than 
are itemizing taxpayers.38
2.  Performance of Services
The second type of charitable exclusion upon which this Article focuses 
is for the performance of services. The income tax does not impute income 
from the gratuitous performance of services. If a donor contributes her ser-
vices to a charitable organization, neither the donor nor the charitable recipi-
ent includes the value of those services in income.39 From the perspective of 
the nonitemizer, the analysis is straightforward. For a donor who receives 
$10 per hour for her services and is subject to a 15% rate of income tax and 
wishes to make a charitable contribution of $100, a service donation is supe-
rior to cash. Taking only the federal income tax into account, if the donor 
contributes cash, the donor must work for nearly 12 hours to earn enough 
to have $100 remaining after tax to contribute the $100 to charity.40 On the 
other hand, if the donor contributes $100 worth of her services to the charity, 
she need work only ten hours to fulfill the $100 gift. The income, net of tax, 
from the additional nearly two hours of labor remains in the donor’s pocket. 
The charitable recipient should be indifferent to the form of the contribution 
if it can find a way to substitute the donor’s services for services for which it 
otherwise would pay.
The charitable exclusion for services reaches beyond the federal income tax 
and into state income taxes and the social security and Medicare taxes as well. 
A nonitemizer whose wages are less than the social security contribution base 
ceiling,41 who is not eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or has 
reached the credit maximum,42 and who has the time and opportunity to earn 
an additional $100 in wages but who gives the $100 worth of services to char-
ity instead of cash, gets a tax benefit from the gift of her tax rate plus the social 
security and Medicare tax rates. To illustrate: assume a nonitemizer in a 15% 
38 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
39 Reg. § 1.61-2(c) (excluding the value of contributed services from the service provider’s 
gross income but not services provided to a third party with payment to the charitable orga-
nization).
40 The donor must earn $117.65 to have $100 remaining after paying the 15% income tax.
41 Under section 3121, the Code imposes the social security tax (or self-employment tax) on 
income from services to the extent of the social security contribution and benefit base under 
section 230 of the Social Security Act that increases with inflation. I.R.C. § 3121. In 2013 
that amount is $113,700. Social Security Administration, Benefits Planner: Maximum Taxable 
Earnings (1937 - 2014), Official Soc. Security Website, last accessed Feb. 22, 2014, http://
www.socialsecurity.gov/planners/maxtax.htm#maxEarnings.
42 I.R.C. § 32 (discussing the EITC); see Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 444 (show-
ing inflation adjustments for the EITC among other tax items and the maximum amount of 
income to which the credit applies as $13,340 with the phaseout of the EITC beginning in 
most instances at $17,530). For taxpayers eligible for the EITC, having one or more qualifying 
children and incomes less than the maximum credit limit, including the additional income 
increases the EITC by more than the percentage of income, social security, and Medicare tax.
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federal marginal income tax bracket43 and subject to the six percent Missouri 
state income44 tax avoids the tax on the $100 of income from those services 
($15 federal plus $6 state). In addition, the taxpayer avoids the $6.20, 6.2% 
employee share, of the social security tax and the $1.45, 1.45%, employee 
share of the Medicare tax. The employee may bear the burden in the form 
of lower wages of the employer’s share of those taxes as well. If so, the value 
of the services the employee donates to charity is greater than $10 per hour 
since an employer not subject to the wage taxes would pay the employee 
more than $10 per hour. The tax savings (or subsidy) is $28.65 ($15 federal 
income tax, $6 Missouri income tax, plus $7.65 social security and Medicare 
tax) or more.
III.  A Closer Look at the Combined Charitable Deduction and  
Gain Exclusion: Examples
The following examples simplify the analysis of the charitable contribu-
tion deduction by ignoring the federal income tax deduction for state taxes 
and using the 39.6% maximum federal rate and the six percent maximum 
income tax rate in Missouri45 rather than the hypothetical, graduated state 
rates that the previous example uses.46 If the previous example had used the 
same assumptions, the tax savings from the $100 contribution would have 
been $45.60 ($39.60 federal income tax plus $6 Missouri state income tax).
Assume that, rather than making a contribution of cash, the taxpayer con-
tributes unencumbered, marketable securities the taxpayer has owned for 
more than one year47 and in which the taxpayer has an adjusted basis of 
zero.48 If the fair market value of the securities on the date of contribution 
is $100, the taxpayer may claim a charitable contribution deduction in the 
amount of $100. Assuming the taxpayer is taxed at the maximum federal and 
Missouri state income tax rates, the tax reduction from the contribution is 
$45.60.49 In addition, the taxpayer excludes the potential $20 tax on the net 
43 I.R.C. § 1. Rev. Proc. 2013-15, 2013-5 I.R.B. 445, shows a 15% federal income tax 
bracket for 2013 in the range of $8,925 to $48,600, depending on the taxpayer’s filing status.
44 The maximum rate of six percent in Missouri applies to Missouri taxable income in excess 
of $9,000. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.011.
45 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.011 (imposing a six percent tax on income in excess of $9,000).
46 See supra Part II.A.
47 See generally § 1(h) (imposing a maximum 20% tax on net capital gain); I.R.C. § 1222(11) 
(defining net capital gain); § 1222(3) (defining long term capital gain).
48 The choice of a hypothetical zero adjusted basis simplifies the computations. Rarely would 
a taxpayer’s adjusted basis in securities be zero since, unlike depreciable property which often 
has a zero adjusted basis after adjustments for depreciation under section 1016(a)(2), a tax-
payer’s adjusted basis in securities generally would not diminish from purchase price, unless the 
issuer made nontaxable distributions to the holders of the securities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 301(a), 
(c)(2) (nondividend distributions to the extent of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis).
49 Ignoring the federal income tax deduction under section 164 (deduction for taxes, includ-
ing the state income tax).
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capital gain50 she would have incurred if she sold the securities and the addi-
tional $6 state tax since Missouri, like many other states, does not distinguish 
capital gain from ordinary income. The total tax savings in this instance may 
be as much as $65.60 for a net cost of the contribution of $34.40.
From the charity’s perspective, but for transaction costs, the gift of cash is 
economically equivalent to the gift of marketable securities. The charity is 
indifferent to whether it receives $100 cash or $100 of marketable securities 
since it will recognize no taxable gain when it sells the securities because it 
is exempt from tax.51 The donor, however, is not indifferent, and the charity 
is pleased to lend the donor the charity’s tax-exempt status in exchange for 
the gift.
The donor may enhance the tax subsidy of the charitable exclusion further 
by donating a valuable collectible item rather than a security.52 If, for exam-
ple, the donor contributes a rare postage stamp having a value of $100 and 
an adjusted basis to the donor of zero to a museum of philately, the avoided 
federal income tax increases to 28% of the untaxed gain, rather than 20%.53 
The donor chooses a museum of philately because the stamp is related to the 
charitable organization’s charitable purpose so the donor may deduct the full 
fair market value of the stamp.54 Assume the same facts as in the previous 
example. The charitable deduction reduces the donor’s tax by $39.60 federal 
income tax, $6 state income tax, and the donor excludes the collectibles gain 
tax of $28.00 and a state income tax on the gain of $6 for a total tax benefit 
of $79.60, leaving the donor with a net cost of the $100 gift of only $20.40. 
Viewed another way, of the $100 donation, $79.60 is federal and state rev-
enue the donor has redirected to the charity to accompany the $20.40 from 
the donor’s pocket.
If one takes the securities gift example further into the state tax regime,55 
the donor also might target the gift to a charitable organization that has state-
granted 55% tax credits to offer the donor.56 In that instance, the donor will 
50 Under section 1001, a sale of the securities (a capital asset under section 1221) at their 
$100 value would result in long-term capital gain to the taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 1222(3) (defin-
ing long-term capital gain). Absent offsetting capital losses, that gain becomes net capital gain 
under section 1222(11), subject to a maximum 20% rate of tax under section 1(h)(1)(C).
51 See I.R.C. § 501(a).
52 See I.R.C. § 1(h)(5) (defining collectibles).
53 Net capital gain from collectibles is subject to a maximum rate of 28%. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(F), 
(h)(4)(B), (h)(5).
54 See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (limiting the deduction to basis in the case of tangible property 
unrelated to the donee’s charitable purpose). Less clear is whether a collectible is intangible 
property because value is a function of its representative character rather than its physical use 
for its original purpose.
55 See supra text accompanying note 46. The stamp, if tangible personal property for pur-
poses of section 170(e)(1)(B), would not be related in service or use to a charity that immedi-
ately sells it to provide affordable housing and only such an organization is likely to be eligible 
for the existing Missouri tax credits.
56 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 32.115 (2013) (allowing the affordable housing credit under Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 32.111).
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have a tax credit of $55 for the $100 gift of marketable securities. The total 
state and federal charitable gift subsidy becomes greater than the value of the 
contributed property as follows: $120.60 is the total tax benefit composed of 
the above $59.60 federal income tax subsidy consisting of the $39.60 deduc-
tion benefit and the $20 exclusion benefit, the $12 state tax subsidy consist-
ing of $6 state tax deduction benefit plus the $6 exclusion benefit, and the 
$55 state income tax credit.57 In this instance, the donor gets to direct $100 
of government revenue to the charity and enhance her personal wealth by as 
much as $20.60.58
While nonitemizers who contribute appreciated property, like itemizers, 
do exclude the tax on their unrealized gain on the contributed property, they, 
as a group, are less likely to own disposable appreciated property than are 
itemizers.59 Nonitemizers generally do not own significant portfolios of secu-
rities60 while itemizers, especially those in the group with incomes in excess of 
$200,000,61 may own sizable securities portfolios and often interests in closely 
held corporations that they may choose to contribute. To level the tax-benefit 
playing field on charitable gifts somewhat between itemizers and nonitem-
izers, the nonitemizer would rely on the charitable exclusion for  services.62
57 Even if one were to take the deduction for state income taxes at the federal level into 
account ($26.53 composed of 39.6% of (1) the state tax savings of $12 from the deduction 
and nontaxation of the gain, and (2) the $55 state tax reduction from the credit), the net 
benefit from the contribution would approach the amount of the contribution ($120.60 less 
$26.53 loss of the state tax deduction is still $94.07).
58 Note on the federal estate tax—the federal estate tax applies in 2013 to taxable estates 
exceeding $5.0 million. I.R.C. § 2001 (imposing the estate tax); I.R.C. § 2010 (providing 
a credit against the federal estate tax). For high wealth taxpayers whose estates might exceed 
those estate tax thresholds, the charitable gift removes property that otherwise might be 
includable in the donor’s taxable estate at death and subject to an estate tax on its value. 
I.R.C. § 2055 (providing an unlimited estate tax deduction for charitable gifts). The estate tax 
deduction has limited significance for purposes of this Article except to the extent that estate 
planning opportunities enable a decedent’s estate to pass more property free of the estate tax to 
noncharitable beneficiaries than would pass without the charitable gift. Moreover, in terms of 
personal sacrifice, the estate tax deduction is of limited significance since the donor would not 
continue to own the property in any event. The donor could remove the property from his or 
her estate by throwing it away, destroying it (if legal), or abandoning it although courts might 
not permit destruction that a decedent directs in his or her will on policy grounds. And if the 
donor chose to destroy the property or take the property along to his or her grave, it would 
not become subject to the estate tax in any event. See N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 
(1921) (upholding the federal estate tax as an indirect tax on the transfer of property rather 
than a direct tax on wealth).
59 Of the 93 million filers with under $50,000 of income, only 14 million or 15% of that 
group itemize. Almost all filers with more than $200,000 income itemize. Congressional 
Budget Office, Pub. No. 4030, Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of Chari-
table Giving 5 (May 2011).
60 Joseph Campbell, Household Finance, 61 J. Fin. 1553, 1563-64 (2006) (noting that most 
households in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution hold only liquid assets and vehi-
cles, with a minority participating in real estate through home-ownership).
61 Congressional Budget Office, supra note 59.
62 See Reg. § 1.61-2(c); see also supra Part II.B.2.
132085_TTL_Spring 2014.indb   527 6/5/14   11:07 AM
528 SECTION OF TAXATION
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 67, No. 3
IV.  Charitable Tax Benefits As Income Splitting or Shifting:  
Policy Considerations in Denying the Charitable Contribution 
Deduction to Nonitemizers
The standard deduction63 may consist of an assumed average array of 
expenditures that taxpayers make, including charitable gifts that might be 
deductible as itemized deductions. Since the amounts of each of those expen-
ditures for nonitemizing taxpayers are small, the standard deduction relieves 
taxpayers of the need to maintain the records that would be necessary to track 
and report them. If the standard deduction embeds an imputed amount of 
charitable contribution within its computation, denying the charitable deduc-
tion to nonitemizers makes sense. A better view of the standard deduction, 
however, would seem to be that it and the personal exemption free a subsis-
tence minimum from the federal income tax. No taxpayer need pay taxes 
that would reduce his or her income below or further below that subsistence 
minimum.64 As a subsistence minimum, the standard deduction has little to 
do with charitable contributions. Other than concern with the administrative 
complexity of recordkeeping and accurate reporting of relatively small chari-
table contributions65 and, of course, the loss of tax revenue that would result 
from extending the deduction to nonitemizers, sound tax policy does not 
compel denial of the charitable contribution deduction to nonitemizers while 
awarding the deduction to itemizers. From time to time, Congress indeed has 
considered a charitable contribution deduction for nonitemizers and even 
included one in the tax law for several years.66
Given the origins of charitable giving in the communitarian obligation 
on the farmer to leave the corners of his field for the poor to harvest,67 with 
the tithe growing from this obligation,68 exclusion of nonitemizers from 
charitable giving tax benefits is ironic. The tithe obligates all members of 
63 I.R.C. § 63(c)(3) (defining standard deduction).
64 Compare Germany where a constitutional mandate defines a subsistence minimum that 
must remain free from the income tax, but not from the value added tax. For example, see 
BVerfGE 82, 60 (1990) and BVerfGE 87, 153 (1992) (decisions of the German Constitu-
tional Court holding in part that the income tax may not diminish the taxpayer’s income to an 
amount less than a subsistence minimum). See generally Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Verti-
cal Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 
Fla. Tax Rev. 259, 302 (2006).
65 See Ellen Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules, 14 Fla. Tax 
Rev. 275, 279-86 (2013) (discussing the problems with overvaluation and the substantiation 
rules).
66 From 1981 to 1986. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121(a), 
95 Stat. 172, 196 (extending the deduction to include nonitemizers). The Tax Reform Act of 
1986 removed the nonitemizer deduction. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 
Stat. 2085.
67 See Adam S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 
153, 160-61 (2007) (discussing the concept of tithing and its relationship to the un-harvested 
corners).
68 See id. at 162-68.
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the community to devote a portion of their incomes, not their wealth, to 
relieve poverty. The church stepped in to administer collection of the tithe 
and distribution of the proceeds of the tithe for the good of the community. 
At its origins, charity was a form of income splitting so that early tax collec-
tion would have reached the income of the individual net of the tithe. In the 
contemporary Mormon Church,69 tithing remains an obligation of church 
adherents and is ten percent of gross income, including recognized gains from 
the sale or exchange of property.70
The current tax law treatment of charitable contributions creates an imper-
fect form of income splitting or shifting to the charitable organization. 
Income shifting is perfect in that all contributions of appreciated property 
enable the donor to shift the recognition of unrealized gain to the donee 
organization.71 The donee organization is exempt from tax so that the donee’s 
share of any unrealized gain from the contributed property never becomes 
subject to the income tax. This ability to shift unrealized gain applies equally 
to ordinary income producing and capital gain property.72
Similarly, both itemizers and nonitemizers may split their incomes from 
services with the charitable organization by performing services for or on 
behalf of the organization. A donor who performs services for a charita-
ble organization is not taxable on imputed income from the value of the 
services,73 and the organization gets the value of the services. If as a volunteer 
the donor performs services on behalf of the charitable organization, and 
the organization resells those services to others, the donor may be taxable,74 
and the organization may be engaging in an unrelated trade or business and 
become subject to the unrelated business income tax on the activity in which 
the donor is engaged.75 The nature of the services and the manner in which 
the charitable donee resells them becomes critical to the charitable exclusion 
and the unrelated business income classification. If, for example, a retired 
nurse contributed some time to a hospital, and the hospital did not adjust 
its billing to take into account that it did not pay the nurse, the resale of the 
nurse’s services to the hospital patients is sufficiently general as not to cause 
the nurse to have imputed income from services. The hospital, of course, 
would not have unrelated business income. On the other hand, if the hospital 
used the contributed services of an auto mechanic to repair cars for which 
it charged customers, imputation of income to the mechanic and unrelated 
business income to the hospital might follow. However, if the hospital only 
69 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
70 Malachi 3:10 (requiring tithing).
71 See supra text accompanying note 28.
72 Id.
73 Reg. § 1.61-2(c); see supra text accompanying note 39.
74 Reg. § 1.61-2(c).
75 I.R.C. § 511 (imposing an income tax at the maximum rate that would be applicable to 
the type of business organization the charity resembles—corporation or trust—on its unrelated 
taxable income under section 512). Section 512 defines unrelated business taxable income.
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provided the services to doctors on staff to help them to travel to the hospital 
without incident, the issue would be a much closer call.
Certain charitable contributions from a donor’s tax-deferred individual 
retirement account (IRA) more closely approximate a true form of income 
splitting than do other charitable gifts of money or property.76 The charitable 
gift from the donor’s IRA diminishes the donor’s gross income.77 Donations 
from individual retirement plans resemble gifts of services, but the donor has 
provided no services for or on behalf of the donee. Unless retired, the donee 
continues to perform services in her own trade or business, ultimately shift-
ing the deferred income through the retirement arrangement to the chari-
table donee. Donors who benefit from the income exclusion by directing 
tax-deferred retirement savings to charitable donees tend to be at the higher 
income levels of society rather than the moderate to low-income group that 
makes up the bulk of the nonitemizer class.78 Unlike true income splitting, 
however, the gift from the retirement arrangement may have been subject 
to the social security or self-employment tax and the Medicare tax when the 
donor funded the retirement arrangement.79
On the donee’s end, the gift carries no imputation of source as it would 
with direct income splitting or income splitting through a partnership.80 
Despite the donor’s deferral of income inclusion and accompanying per-
manent exclusion through the charitable gift, the character of the donee’s 
receipt is a charitable contribution. The donee will not have unrelated busi-
ness income from the contribution even if the donor received the income she 
deferred through the retirement arrangement from the conduct of a trade or 
business that would have been an unrelated trade or business to the donee if 
the donee had received the income from its source.81
The policy underlying the exclusion of IRA charitable contributions from 
the donor’s gross income seems inconsistent with the general tax treatment 
of charitable gifts. If the donor tries to split her income from services with 
a charity, the assignment of income doctrine causes her to be taxed on the 
76 Section 408(d)(8) permits the owner of an IRA who is at least 70 and one half years old 
to contribute up to $100,000 per year to charity from the IRA without including the distribu-
tion in the donor’s income. The provision terminated at the end of 2013. I.R.C. § 408(d)(8)
(F). The social security tax or the self-employment tax, whichever applies, and the Medicare tax 
reach the deductible contributions to an IRA although the income tax does not.
77 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (defining gross income).
78 Thomas L. Hungerford & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., RL30255, 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs): Issues and Proposed Expansion 13 (2012) 
(observing that high income individuals are the primary users of individual retirement accounts 
even though Congress targeted that deferral benefit to moderate income taxpayers).
79 Cf. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5) (excluding employer contributions to certain qualified retirement 
arrangement from the social security wage base but not employee contributions).
80 Cf. I.R.C. § 702(b) (extending to partners deemed to be engaged in the trade or business 
of the partnership); I.R.C. § 512(c)(1).
81 IRA charitable gifts are contributions, so that the donor’s income source is not imputed 
to the charity.
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income.82 Similarly, if the donor provides services on behalf of a charitable 
organization to a third party in exchange for a payment to the charitable orga-
nization, she is taxable on the income83 and may claim a charitable contribu-
tion deduction for the amount of the gift.84 Yet, contribution of the income 
from services that the taxpayer has deferred through an IRA85 receives more 
favorable treatment as it reduces what otherwise would be the donor’s gross 
income or the gross income of the beneficiary who receives the rights to the 
donor’s IRA after the donor’s death.86
While the charitable exclusion permitting the shifting of gain from appre-
ciated property and income from services to the charitable donee is available 
to all taxpayers without regard to filing status or the aggregate amount of their 
itemized deductions, the charitable deduction itself is available only to item-
izing taxpayers. Unlike the charitable exclusion, the deduction is imperfect as 
a means of income splitting. The deduction splits income in that it dimin-
ishes the amount of the donor’s taxable income. Imperfection in splitting 
arises because, for individuals, (1) the deduction is itemized, that is, deduct-
ible only to the extent itemized deductions exceed the standard deduction;87 
(2) the deduction is subject to contribution base limitations;88 (3) to the 
extent that the donor gives some of the donor’s income from her services to 
the charity, the donor still must pay the social security and Medicare taxes to 
which the service income is subject, even if the gift otherwise is deductible, 
as there is no deduction for charitable contributions in the social security and 
Medicare bases;89 and (4) as an itemized deduction, other tax items that are 
a function of adjusted gross income—for example, medical expense deduc-
82 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
83 Reg. § 1.61-2(c); see supra text accompanying note 38.
84 I.R.C. § 170(a).
85 Cf. I.R.C. § 408(d)(8)(A) (excluding the charitable distribution from the donor’s IRA 
from the donor’s gross income); § 408(d)(8)(E) (denying a charitable contribution deduction 
to the donor for the amount paid from the donor’s IRA).
86 Distributions to a beneficiary from a decedent’s IRA are income in respect of a decedent 
under section 691 and not property that receives a new fair market value basis as it passes 
through the donor’s estate. See I.R.C. § 691(a).
87 See I.R.C. § 63.
88 See I.R.C. § 170(b); see supra text accompanying note 6. Until 2010, the charitable contri-
bution deduction was also subject to the itemized deduction limitation in section 68.
89 Both the social security and Medicare taxes under section 3101 permit no deductions 
in the computation of the tax base, and the self-employment tax under section 1401 allows 
ordinary and necessary business deductions in it computations but not items that fall within 
the definition of itemized deductions. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 1401. The social security tax generally 
will not impact the higher wage donors because their incomes will exceed the social security 
and self-employment tax wage base. See §§ 3101(b)(2), 1401(b)(2)(A).
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tions90 or limitations on the miscellaneous itemized deductions91—remain 
unaffected by the charitable contribution deduction. The charitable deduc-
tion’s unequal treatment of taxpayers seems inconsistent with the charitable 
exclusion’s equal treatment of taxpayers. Administrative convenience, record-
keeping burdens, opportunities to cheat, and personal sacrifice all may help 
to explain the distinction between the exclusion and the deduction, but none 
of those reasons explains it compellingly.
V.  Charitable Contributions and the False Notion of Sacrifice
Most people probably would agree that sacrifice of some kind should be an 
essential condition to the charitable contribution deduction,92 and that the 
size of the tax benefit should grow in relation to the amount of the donor’s 
sacrifice. The more of one’s wealth one contributes, the greater the charitable 
deduction benefit should be. While that argument seems sensible, earlier 
examples illustrate that, in some charitable contribution instances, the chari-
table tax benefits equal or even exceed the donor’s economic sacrifice.93 That 
same argument also misses the relative sacrifice element of charitable con-
tributions. Many taxpayers whose relative sacrifice is greatest get little or no 
tax benefit. Nonitemizers make the greatest relative sacrifice when they make 
charitable gifts because $1 of contribution costs them $1,94 while itemizers, 
especially those who are subject to no contribution base limitations,95 make 
a smaller relative sacrifice since the tax benefit causes each dollar of contribu-
tion to cost them less than $1.96
90 See I.R.C. § 213(a) (allowing a deduction for medical expenses only to the extent they 
exceed ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income under section 62, and, for the next 
three years, only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income if the 
taxpayer is 65 or older).
91 See I.R.C. § 67(a) (limiting the deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions to the 
amount by which they exceed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income).
92 The donor should get no deduction without giving up something, having some “skin in 
the game.” The concept “skin in the game,” often attributed probably erroneously to Warren 
Buffet, see William Safire, On Language: Skin in the Game, N.Y. Times Magazine, Sept. 17, 
2006, to refer to corporate and investment managers who have a material stake in the busi-
nesses they manage, refers to the stake that the donor must have as a condition to claiming the 
charitable contribution deduction.
93 See supra Part III.
94 Note that this is not a marginal utility argument that a dollar is worth more to a poor 
person than to a rich one.
95 See I.R.C. § 170(b); supra text accompanying note 6.
96 See examples supra Part III.
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Unless nonitemizers believe they get a charitable contribution deduction 
when they do not,97 the charitable contribution deduction must not drive 
nonitemizers’ decisions to contribute or not to contribute to charity.98 While 
altruism and sensitivity to the plight of others probably accounts for much 
charitable giving, explicit and implicit pressure from employers and peers 
may account for a significant share of nonitemizers’ contributions to char-
ity in the absence of any tax benefit. Employers, perhaps unintentionally, 
may influence employees when they cooperate with charitable organizations99 
by facilitating employees’ contributions to the organization through a pay-
roll deduction plan. Some, possibly many, employees who do not itemize 
deductions may feel uncomfortable not participating when they receive plan 
notices at work and announcements of participation rates even though they 
otherwise would not contribute. In the workplace, colleagues and supervi-
sors frequently solicit contributions on behalf of their favorite charities. Such 
solicitations exert pressure on employees to contribute. Employees who can 
ill afford to contribute feel themselves obligated because of the public nature 
of the collection or their specific relationship with the person soliciting the 
donation. More compelling still is the combination of the public nature of 
the collection plate or solicitation in a place of worship.100
While similar factors may motivate charitable giving among those who do 
get a tax benefit from their contributions, additional elements may play a 
role as well. For those able to make significant contributions, nonmonetary 
benefits including recognition, power, control, and the ability to redirect gov-
ernment revenues to favored causes101 may motivate the donor. Donors often 
97 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable Deduction: An Introduction 
to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1307, 1309-10 (2012) (arguing that many taxpayers think 
they benefit from the deduction who do not). For a discussion of taxpayers arguing against 
their personal interest with respect to tax law proposals, see Henry Ordower, The Culture of 
Tax Avoidance, 55 St. Louis U. L.J. 47, 117-18 (2010) (arguing that many opponents of the 
estate tax would never become subject to that tax and misunderstand its context and reach).
98 Of the 93 million filers with under $50,000 of income in 2008, the 14 million who item-
ized (15%) accounted for roughly half of that bracket’s charitable donations ($20.0 billion 
of the $37.0 billion). Congressional Budget Office, supra note 59, at 5. The remaining 
$17.0 billion of charitable contributions generated no tax benefit to their donors because 
these donors took the standard deduction. See id. at 7. There was an additional $9.0 billion 
unclaimed in the $50,000–$200,000 brackets, with 58% of filers in the $50,000–$100,000 
bracket itemizing and 85.7% of filers in the $100,000–$200,000 bracket itemizing. Id. at 5. 
Almost all filers with more than $200,000 of income itemize. See id.
99 The United Way, for example.
100 See Eric Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: Domestic Activities, Foreign 
Activities, or None of the Above, 63 Hastings L.J. 361, 368-69, 407 (2012) (arguing that there 
is no reason to favor some organizations aiding foreign activities over others as the Code now 
does for technical reasons, and showing statistics that nonitemizers make proportionally more 
of their charitable contributions to churches than do itemizers).
101 See id. at 365 (making the observation about directing government revenues to charitable 
organizations). For a good discussion of the distributive justice aspect of this ability to direct 
governmental revenues, see also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsi-
dies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 505, 537 (2010).
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get recognition in the form of naming rights when they make significant gifts. 
The donee organization may name a building, room, or fund after the donor. 
Moreover, donors get recognition from both professional and peer volunteer 
solicitors who frequently court significant donors to secure major gifts. Power 
and control come to donors in the form of organization board memberships 
and offices that enable the donors to assert some control over the organiza-
tion’s decision-making with respect to both programs and the acquisition of 
facilities.102 And donors who may not believe that the government spends 
tax revenues wisely may redirect money they otherwise might pay in taxes to 
organizations that share the donor’s views.103
For very wealthy donors, their charitable contributions are perhaps unlikely 
to diminish their standard of living insofar as their contributions may be sur-
plus wealth, wealth the donors will not consume. Surplus wealth, however, is 
a relative concept. Although people’s notions of what constitutes surplus dif-
fer, there probably is some point at which most people would view additional 
wealth to be surplus. In their canonical treatment of progressive taxation,104 
for example, Professors Blum and Kalven conclude that marginal utility of 
wealth is not a sufficient argument for progressivity in taxation because it is so 
difficult to measure. Short of a Scrooge McDuck-like obsession with simple 
possession of wealth,105 however, transfer to others of part of one’s wealth 
is not a sacrifice, as long as one reserves adequate wealth to fuel one’s own, 
unlimited consumption.
Even in the absence of any diminution of one’s own consumption, people 
continue to have an interest in the use of the wealth they have accumulated. 
Most people do not wish to share their wealth with people or causes they 
do not like or consider unworthy. Frequently, people try to retain control 
over expenditure of their wealth although they have no personal use for it. 
Control, not continuing ownership, is important. The grantor trust rules of 
the Code, for example, recognize the importance of continuing control.106 
Donors regularly use trusts, restrictive co-ownership arrangements, and pri-
102 See Peter Buffett, Op-Ed., The Charitable-Industrial Complex, N.Y. Times, July 26, 2013, 
at A19.
103 Id.
104 Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation 
56-63 (1953).
105 Scrooge McDuck was Donald Duck’s uncle in the Donald Duck comic book series. 
Scrooge was, as his name suggests, wealthy and stingy. He kept his money in a vault and spent 
countless hours counting it. Each amount of money was critically important to him, so that 
relinquishing even a small sum was painful.
106 See I.R.C. §§ 671, 674 (treating the grantor as the owner of the trust and taxable on 
its income if the grantor retains powers over the income or principal of the trust short of the 
power to spend for the grantor’s consumption). Similarly, see the retained interest rules of the 
estate tax. See I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2), 2038.
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vate foundations in order to retain some direct or indirect control over wealth 
while relinquishing ownership.107
Where one has little personal use for the wealth, the wealth may provide 
the donor with the power and pleasure of giving. Whether for the relief of 
human suffering or to support artistic endeavors, eleemosynary organiza-
tions—churches, political campaigns, and a variety of other organizations 
that rely on donations employ vast numbers of both paid professional staff 
and volunteers to help the organizations—capture a share of the public’s dis-
cretionary spending.108 In exchange, fundraisers may offer significant donors 
a variety of tangible gifts and intangible benefits—in addition to the warm 
feelings one gets from helping an important cause or activity—in exchange 
for their generosity.
For donors with large amounts of surplus wealth, charitable giving also may 
offer an opportunity to cleanse their names. While over time we may forget 
that some corporations dealt in worker exploitation, monopolization, price 
gouging, and discrimination, we now only associate their names with signifi-
cant positive charitable giving. In addition, living donors often continue to 
exert significant direct or indirect control over their donated wealth.109 Even 
when the donor retains no power to determine the use of the charitable gift, 
management of an organization that has received a significant gift may hope 
to woo the donor to make further gifts. In such cases, management is likely 
to remain sensitive to the interests and goals of the donor. Even if the donor 
retains no direct control over the donated funds, major charitable donors 
customarily define the mission of the charitable funds they establish and, in 
that manner, continue to influence decisions as to the distribution of funds 
to donees often long after the donor’s death. The donors have made minimal, 
if any, sacrifice. The wealth they relinquished was surplus, and they retain 
the only incident of ownership of that wealth about which they really care; 
they continue to exert some control over what they give away. The reward 
of a charitable subsidy in those instances seems unnecessary and, perhaps, 
unwarranted.
Yet, those wealthy donors are likely to be able to direct the expenditure of 
some governmental resources of both the United States and the state in which 
they reside alongside the direct expenditure of their own wealth. Through 
107 Emily Barman, With Strings Attached: Nonprofits and the Adoption of Donor Choice, 37 
Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 39, 44 (2008) (stating that young individuals and 
educated professionals drive a current shift in charitable giving toward donor choice and pro-
fessionalization of nonprofits, requesting donor designation being accustomed to choice in the 
market and demanding control).
108 Many might argue that frequently churches capture a share of the nondiscretionary 
spending that the donor might use better to provide for his or her family’s basic needs. See 
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 59, at 21 (showing a strong inverse correlation 
between income and percent donation to religious organizations). That discussion is perhaps 
better suited to an article that argues for differing amounts of charitable contribution deduc-
tion that depend on the nature of the recipient organization.
109 Charitable gift funds and private foundations, for examples.
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federal and state income tax deductions and credits, the governments subsi-
dize the donors’ charitable gifts.110 The subsidies are meaningful tax expendi-
tures that one may characterize equally as subsidy to the donor or subsidy to 
the donee organization.111
The preceding paragraphs do not suggest that major donors to organiza-
tions are other than genuinely charitable. Their gifts have great value and are 
critical to the continued existence of many important organizations. Never-
theless, their generosity often comes with little or no “skin in the game.”112
For other charitable donors, gifts involve varying degrees of sacrifice. Many 
moderate-income individuals make charitable gifts even though they lack 
surplus wealth. They donate wealth that they otherwise might consume to 
maintain or improve their and their families’ own standard of living. What-
ever one’s view of such sacrifice, there can be no doubt that nonitemizers bear 
a proportionally larger share of each dollar they contribute than do itemizers.
Perhaps the underlying justification for the unequal treatment of itemiz-
ers and nonitemizers in the charitable contribution deduction does not lie 
in relative personal sacrifice but in some collective perception that decisions 
the group of taxpayers getting the greatest aggregate benefit from both the 
exclusion and the deduction make are better than decisions the group of 
nonitemizers might make. Perhaps wealthy people do a better job of redi-
recting governmental resources to charities than less wealthy taxpayers do. A 
strong proponent of the separation of church and state might even favor that 
unequal treatment since nonitemizers tend to give to religious organizations, 
while itemizers support a broader range of causes, including cultural institu-
tions.113 Were that the reason for the difference in treatment, it might make 
better sense to deny the deduction and the exclusion to religious organiza-
tions. Such a radical change in the treatment of charitable gifts is unlikely, but 
nonitemizers and their charitable donees could capture a larger share of the 
charitable contribution tax benefits by refocusing the form of their gifts and 
substituting, whenever possible, services for cash.
110 See Part II of this Article for the financial analysis of the governmental subsidies.
111 Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 Ind. L.J. 1047, 
1047-48 (2009) (arguing that the ability to direct government revenue with charitable contri-
butions is undemocratic).
112 Emily Barman, An Institutional Approach to Donor Control: From Dyadic Ties to a Field-
Level Analysis, 112 Am. J. Soc. 1416, 1421 (2007). Those donating motivated by economic 
factors expect material, emotional, or prestige–based benefit; those donating for other reasons 
are still motivated by social rational calculation of individuals–giving not motivated by tan-
gible benefits for individual, but instead by societal norms and obligations. “Charitable giving 
does not derive from the exchange of material goods but instead from the social relationships 
that it engenders. Reciprocity involves social or moral obligations between givers and recipi-
ents, either between two actors who exchange gifts or between the whole collectivity.” Id.
113 See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 59; Zolt, supra note 100 and accom-
panying text.
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VI.  The Charitable Gift Exclusion for the Unwealthy: Contributions  
of Services
As preceding sections of this Article demonstrate, tax benefits from cash 
contributions to charity elude taxpayers who do not itemize their deduc-
tions. Since those nonitemizers as a class tend to have lower incomes than 
the class of taxpayers who itemize deductions, the class of nonitemizers also 
is far less likely than itemizers to own appreciated properties that they might 
contribute to charity and receive the benefit of the charitable exclusion of 
gain. If low to moderate-income individuals have appreciated property at all, 
that property often is their personal residence that they cannot contribute 
to charity without undermining their own quality of life.114 Even if they did 
contribute their personal residences, the charitable gain exclusion in most 
instances would be no greater than the general exclusion of gain on the sale of 
one’s personal residence.115 Since nonitemizers capture neither the charitable 
contribution deduction nor the charitable exclusion for appreciated property, 
nonitemizers’ charitable contributions of money and property do not redirect 
government revenues to their favored charitable causes. In that respect, those 
contributions are less tax efficient than the contributions of itemizers. Nev-
ertheless, statistics on charitable giving disclose that nonitemizers regularly 
make cash gifts to charities, especially religious organizations.116 For non-
itemizing taxpayers, the charitable contribution of their services would be a 
far more efficient tax choice than cash contributions are. Service contribu-
tions would enable nonitemizers to redirect governmental revenues through 
the charitable services exclusion as itemizers are able to do with cash and 
property contributions.
From time to time, some legislators117 and commentators118 have proposed 
a deduction or credit for the contribution of services to charity. A deduc-
tion or credit for service contributions is not supportable because the donor 
never took the income from the contributed services into account. Funda-
mental tax principles require that the taxpayer include an item in income as 
114 Campbell, supra note 60 (noting that most households in the bottom quartile of the 
wealth distribution hold only liquid assets and vehicles, with only a minority participating in 
real estate through home-ownership).
115 See I.R.C. § 121 (excluding up to $500,000 of gain on the sale of one’s principal resi-
dence for certain joint returns and up to $250,000 for other returns).
116 See Congressional Budget Office, supra note 59; see Zolt, supra note 100 and 
accompanying text.
117 See, e.g., Charity Care Tax Deduction for Physicians Act of 2012, supra note 2 (proposing 
a deduction for physicians offering charity care).
118 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2 (proposing an imputed charitable contribution deduction 
or credit for volunteer services).
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a condition of the deduction.119 Allowing a deduction to taxpayers for the 
value of their donated services, while not imputing income from the services 
to the donor taxpayers, would double the benefit to the donor and further 
diminish essential governmental revenues. The fact that a donor gets a deduc-
tion for the full value of contributed property but need not include the gain 
in income is inconsistent with the fundamental concept that underlies the 
charitable contribution since the donor has not taken the item producing the 
deduction into account to the extent of the untaxed appreciation in value.120
The following example illustrates the observations in the preceding para-
graph and the tax efficiency of the service contribution for a highly-compen-
sated individual.121 Assume that a medical doctor bills her time for patient 
care at $300 per hour. The doctor contributes the equivalent in money of 
five hours of her time to a free clinic for the needy—$1,500 in cash.122 The 
charity pays another doctor to provide services to patients. The payment to 
the paid doctor is taxable to the doctor. If the paid doctor is an employee of 
the clinic, the clinic must pay a Medicare tax on the doctor’s salary (1.45% of 
the $1,500 or $21.75) and a social security tax up to the social security wage 
ceiling for the year (possibly as much as 6.2% or $93). The paid doctor must 
include the payment in his income subject to the income tax (maximum rate 
of 39.6% of the $1,500 or $594), and the paid doctor pays his share of the 
Medicare and social security taxes. While the income tax on that inclusion in 
income for income tax purposes may be substantially equivalent to the reduc-
tion in income tax from the deduction the donor doctor receives, it is not 
119 Basic Federal Income Taxation includes the case of Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 
224 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975). William D. Andrews & Peter J. 
Wiedenbeck, Basic Federal Income Taxation 46-47, 179-89 (6th ed. 2009). While not 
a services decision, the principle in Haverly is analogous. There the taxpayer claimed and was 
denied a deduction for the value of textbooks he received without charge from the publisher 
as samples. He did not include the value of the textbooks in income when he received them. 
The Service could have asserted, but it did not, that the value of the textbooks was income to 
him when he received them. Haverly’s receipt of the books did not meet the objective donative 
intent standard of Duberstein v. Commissioner, necessary to exclusion of a gift from income 
under section 102. I.R.C. § 102; Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). But 
Haverly could not claim a deduction for the textbooks because he had not taken them into 
account for tax purposes by purchasing them or including their value in his income. Taking 
into account, of course, is not the same as having paid tax on the item. One may contribute 
property that one has received by gift, for example, and still claim a deduction. The donee of 
property received by gift takes her donor’s adjusted basis in the property. That adjusted basis 
is from the original owner (or his predecessor in interest) having acquired the property in a 
taxable transaction using funds on which the tax was paid (unless exempt from tax) to acquire 
the property.
120 Limiting the deduction to the donor’s adjusted basis in this context, as the statute limits 
the deduction in the case of ordinary income producing property, would make sound tax 
policy in this context. See Fleischer, supra note 7 (recommending lower contribution base 
limitations for appreciated property).
121 Federal taxes only. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
122 The $1,500 may entail transaction costs that diminish the value of the donation: credit 
card fees, bank fees for collecting the check, and payments to fundraisers.
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identical. The donor doctor and her employer (or the doctor if self-employed) 
paid the Medicare tax ($21.75 as above) when she earned the income (and 
possibly a social security tax of $93) and may lose part of the benefit of her 
own deductions because of floors on deductibility or phase-outs of other ben-
efits that relate to her amount of adjusted gross income.123 To avoid too much 
counting of tax benefits, we recognize that the paid doctor is likely to fill his 
available work time in any event, so his inclusion is the substitution of hours 
for the clinic for hours in another paid practice.
On the other hand, if the donor doctor contributes five hours of her medi-
cal services, rather than money, the clinic receives $1,500 of service value. 
The donor doctor includes nothing in income from those five hours. Instead 
of an itemized deduction of $1,500, the donor simply excludes $1,500 from 
her gross income. Her adjusted gross income base for other computations 
declines in an equal amount. Further, the nonimputation of income from 
the charitable services also prevents the value of the services from being clas-
sified as wages or self-employment income subject to social security or self-
employment tax and Medicare tax. The charitable clinic pays no wages to the 
donor doctor and, accordingly, pays no employer’s share of the social security 
or Medicare tax. The combined net tax savings in this example ranges from 
2.9% (Medicare tax only) to upwards of 15.3% depending on the adjusted-
gross-income-affected items even in the instance that the donor would get a 
charitable deduction tax benefit from the contribution.124 If, contrary to cur-
rent law, the doctor also were to receive a charitable contribution deduction 
for the value of her services, the tax benefit of the income exclusion almost 
would double.
In those cases in which the donor does not itemize deductions, the tax 
savings from the exclusion is even greater since a cash contribution would 
yield no income tax benefit either.125 In addition, for low-income employed 
individuals who make charitable contributions but have reached the phase-
out threshold for the EITC, contributions of services may protect their EITC 
when additional compensated hours might cause the credit to phase out.126 
For example, a taxpayer having two or more qualifying children and currently 
receiving the maximum earned income credit must reduce the amount of 
credit by 20.22 cents for each additional dollar of compensation (or other 
income) the taxpayer receives.127 Accordingly, if that taxpayer works addi-
tional hours and receives $100 that she gives to charity, the $100 of com-
123 See I.R.C. § 67 (miscellaneous itemized deductions); I.R.C. § 213 (medical expense 
deductions).
124 See supra Part II.B.2 (state income tax example).
125 Of course, this is not a realistic option for those low income taxpayers who may not have 
the flexibility to substitute labor for cash. Employers may demand that the employee devote all 
her available working hours to the employer’s business.
126 See I.R.C. § 32(b)(2) (showing the amount of income at which the EITC phases out); 
see supra note 41.
127 See § 32(b)(2).
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pensation costs the taxpayer an additional $20.22 in reduced earned income 
credit as well as being subject to social security tax, Medicare tax, and income 
tax. The total tax cost that the taxpayer could avoid by performing the $100 
of services gratuitously for charity is as much as $42.87, that is, $15 at a 15% 
income tax rate, $7.65 social security and Medicare tax, plus $20.22 phase-
out of the earned income credit.
In addition, the donor has greater flexibility in her choice of recipients 
for contributions of her services than an itemizer has for contributions of 
cash or property. Restrictions on the class of permissible charitable donees of 
cash and property128 do not limit service donors’ choices of recipients of the 
donors’ benevolence. The charitable donee that receives the services may be a 
domestic or foreign charity. In the case of a foreign charity, the organization 
need not rely on a domestic feeder organization for the contribution to qual-
ify for deductibility in the United States.129 In fact, the donor may contribute 
services on the same basis to any organization, even one that is not charitable 
at all, if it serves a political purpose, or is simply a for-profit entity.130
The U.S. income tax system fails to impute income from services in many 
contexts. Absent a market exchange where the donor has an expectation of 
tangible reciprocity, as opposed to intangible benefits like recognition, bless-
ings, and like benefits, the tax system does not reach imputed income from 
personal services whether the gift of services is charitable or noncharitable. 
Even in the presence of reciprocal expectations, the Code does not require 
inclusion of imputed income from one’s services if the other party to the 
reciprocal arrangement bears certain relationships to the service provider, 
including spousal, co-habitant, and possibly even communal.131 Vast num-
bers of unpaid household and child care workers perform services in their 
own home and the value of those services never becomes imputed income.132
Similarly, some religious organizations rely exclusively, or nearly so, on vol-
unteer workers rather than paid staff to execute the principal religious func-
128 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
129 The service donor’s out-of-pocket expenses will not be deductible, however, as they would 
be in the case of services donated to a section §501(c)(3) donee.
130 One might expect that a donor would be reluctant to donate services to a profit-seeking 
venture, yet scores of university students do just that each year in the form of unpaid intern-
ships. See Dylan Matthews, Are Unpaid Internships Illegal?, Wash. Post, June 13, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/13/are-unpaid-internships-illegal/ 
(describing the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit holding that unpaid 
internships in media production violate wage and hours laws); infra note 132. See generally 
Ross Perlin, Op-Ed, Unpaid Interns, Complicit Colleges, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2011, http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/04/03/opinion/03perlin.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (providing a recent 
critique of unpaid internships and colleges’ role in supporting them).
131 Cf. I.R.C. § 61.
132 Cf. Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Geo. L.J. 1571, 1606-10 (1996) (arguing in 
a cutting-edge article that taxing housework would both define the value of the services that 
most often women perform in their homes and enable those women to participate directly 
in the social security retirement system and other benefits that tie into compensated service 
income).
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tions of the church. The Catholic Church, for example, has depended for its 
basic functions on unpaid workers.133 Both priests and nuns take vows of pov-
erty and provide services on behalf of the Church to parishioners.134 Similarly, 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reaches deeply into its mem-
bership to provide services in its many missions by expecting each adherent to 
spend some period doing uncompensated service.135 And the tax system often 
fails to reach the considerable amount of value of personal services even when 
there is a market exchange, such as in unpaid internships.136 Those intern-
ships appear to be reciprocal service arrangements. The intern receives train-
ing that, the intern hopes, will lead to employment with the organization for 
which he is interning or another organization needing someone with that 
training. In those instances, both the donor and donee should be taxable on 
the value of the services, as the arrangement is a market exchange for value, 
a taxable event. Often, failure to impute income from a market exchange is 
a matter of the administrative difficulty of identifying and determining the 
value of the exchanged services.137 Occasionally, however, when the Service 
seeks to determine the value of and tax reciprocal service arrangements, Con-
gress bars it from doing so.138
If, for example, A, an auto mechanic, repairs her own car, she is not tax-
able on the value of those services that substitute for what otherwise would 
require a taxable market exchange. If A agrees to repair B’s car if B cleans 
A’s kitchen, there is a true, observable market exchange.139 Both A and B 
should be taxable on the value of the services exchanged unless A and B are 
spouses, co-habitants, or, possibly, members of some sort of cohesive unit, 
a commune perhaps, where members of the commune share responsibili-
133 See 1983 Code of Canon Law c.668, §§ 1-5 (describing the vows of poverty taken by 
nuns); id. at c.1008 (describing the duties of priests).
134 Id.
135 The official website of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints outlines many mis-
sionary opportunities for church members. Missionary Work, The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, last accessed Jan. 18, 2014, http://mormon.org/missionary-work/.
136 See supra text accompanying note 128.
137 Consider the debate concerning carried interests in private equity funds that Victor 
Fleischer recently brought to national attention. See generally Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: 
Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (analyzing 
various arguments for taxing a profits interest but concluding that the private equity fund 
managers should have ordinary income from their profits interests in the private equity funds). 
On the issue of service partnerships, see generally Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to 
Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 Tax Law. 19 (1992) (arguing that the profits interests should be 
taxable as open transactions).
138 See I.R.C. § 132(a)(1) (no additional cost service); Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-427, § 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996 (moratorium on fringe benefit regulations preceding enactment 
of section 132).
139 I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1)(B), (c)(3) (including barter exchanges in information reporting for 
brokers). The information reporting obligation does not apply to informal exchanges of similar 
services under noncommercial arrangements like baby-sitting exchanges. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(4).
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ties for various services necessary to the operation of the commune.140 As 
to the value of the services, the exchange equivalency doctrine requires that 
only the value of A’s or B’s services become determinable because the arm’s 
length nature of the exchange renders the reciprocal services equal in value 
in a market exchange.141 Nevertheless, uncertainties about value may inhere 
unless either A or B renders substantially identical services to third parties for 
compensation at a constant rate. Exchanges of property are easier to value 
than exchanges of services.
Some arguments for not imputing income from the gratuitous performance 
of services are that (1) one need not charge for one’s services and (2) the value 
of the services is indeterminate because the services are expenditures of time 
that the donor otherwise would not devote to paid employment, making it 
particularly difficult to value. As to the first of these arguments, judicial deci-
sions historically determined that a taxpayer need not charge interest for the 
use of her money.142 As interest rates climbed through the 1970s, Congress 
imputed interest income into low and no-interest loans both in commer-
cial and gift contexts with no exception even for inter-spousal interest-free 
loans.143 Services, like the use of money, have value. As to indeterminacy 
of value, interest-free loans are an easier issue than uncompensated services 
insofar as external standards exist against which one might peg an imputed 
interest rate. While those imputed rates bear little relationship to the rate the 
lender might charge to the borrower having the characteristics of the bor-
rower in the low or interest-free loan, an arguably objective standard does 
determine the imputed rates. Similarly, several European countries impute 
a use value that taxpayers must include in their incomes when they occupy 
homes they own.144 The imputation amount tends to be low relative to mar-
ket rentals for comparable properties, so the inclusion, like the low interest 
loan imputation in the United States,145 understates the use value. Objective 
standards for gratuitous services are more elusive although one might be able 
to develop a national average to provide the minimum imputed wage stan-
dard for the type of services the donor performs.
140 Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1).
141 See Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954) 
(holding that an exchange at arm’s length means that the values of the exchanged property 
interests must be equal).
142 See Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1090 (1961) (holding that noninterest bearing 
loans from a corporation did not generate income taxable to the borrower because the interest, 
if paid, would have been deductible).
143 Section 172(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 699 (July 
18, 1984) added Code section 7872 (imputing interest income into low and no interest loans).
144 The Netherlands, for example, imputes a 0.6% of value rate. See M. Peter van der Hoek 
& Sarah E. Radloff, Taxing Owner-Occupied Housing: Comparing the Netherlands to Other 
European Union Countries, 7 Pub. Fin. & Mgmt. 393 (2007).
145 Cf. I.R.C. § 7872(b).
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VII.  Charities Should Seize the Exclusion Benefit
Imputation of income to charitable donors of services is unlikely to find 
its way into the tax law. Even in the presence of reciprocal arrangements 
like volunteer theater ushers who the theater then allows to stay and watch 
the show, the government is unlikely to seek to tax the benefit to the service 
donor. The charitable community should exploit this opportunity that the tax 
system offers more extensively and effectively than it now does. The exclusion 
of income benefit for charitable donors who give their services, rather than 
their money, to charity affords an attractive opportunity for charities to cap-
ture government revenue in conjunction with the contributions of even their 
low-income donors. At the same time, charitable recipients who otherwise 
would be subject to payroll taxes derive a benefit from using volunteers rather 
than paid employees. Yet, discussion in the literature has focused on debating 
whether or not there should be some special deduction for individuals who 
contribute their services other than treating the donor’s out of pocket expen-
ditures as cash contributions.146
In part, the problem lies in recognizing the value of services to the chari-
table organization.147 When one gives money or property to charity, almost 
invariably, one gets a written note of thanks from someone affiliated with the 
charitable organization.148 Many organizations continue to suggest a value for 
contributions of property.149 Those acknowledgements facilitate the donor’s 
claim for a charitable contribution deduction although many donors who 
receive acknowledgements do not itemize and, therefore, do not claim the 
deduction. Frequently, the acknowledgement of contribution includes lan-
guage that identifies limitations on the deduction and seeks to separate the 
deductible portion of a gift from that part of the payment for which the 
donor receives something in exchange.
The gift acknowledgement, however, serves more than a tax function. 
Charitable organizations often recognize and honor their donors, identifying 
them by size of donation categories, often accompanied by a donor category 
membership—century clubs and similar, but higher, categories.150 A donor 
may achieve a donee level with gifts of money or property or even by des-
ignating the organization as the beneficiary on some low-cost life insurance 
policy but rarely, if ever, with a gift of services. Failure to acknowledge the 
value of the service gifts misses an opportunity. Even if acknowledging would 
146 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 2.
147 Musick & Wilson, supra note 4, at 116 (unrecognized volunteers most likely to discon-
tinue the volunteer activity).
148 Given current substantiation requirements for larger charitable gifts, one now almost 
invariably receives an acknowledgment. See I.R.C. § 170(f )(8) (contemporaneous acknowl-
edgment for gifts of $250 or more).
149 Thrift shops, for example. I.R.C. § 170(f )(16).
150 Most organizations, universities, and cultural institutions identify donor categories in 
their publicity and list donors by donation size in their programs or annual reports to their 
 community.
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mean that the organization would have to include in the acknowledgment a 
caution that the gift is not deductible for federal tax purposes, the organiza-
tion quite possibly would gain the donor’s identification with the organiza-
tion, much as it does with monetary gifts. Giving levels encourage donors to 
continue to give and to increase their gifts over time.
Valuation of services is complicated but perhaps no more so than valuing 
clothing and household goods that one contributes to a thrift shop. Unlike 
valuations of property, there are no tax risks associated with erroneous valu-
ation of services. Absent tax reporting of the value to support a deduction, 
an incorrect value has no external consequences. The arguments that contri-
butions of services have little market value because the donor relinquishes 
leisure time, rather than work time, are specious. Even if the donation of 
services were of one’s leisure time, the measure of value for the donor would 
be subjective as Henry Simon’s paradigmatic Flugeladjutant who hates opera 
emphasizes.151 Perhaps leisure is far more valuable to the individual than work 
hours, so that the donor’s value is greater than for the donor’s work hours. 
Some donors, on the other hand, enjoy working far more than they enjoy 
leisure, so an opportunity to work more, albeit without compensation, is 
particularly beneficial to them. Others have the opportunity to fill all their 
hours with compensated work so that the charitable contribution diminishes 
their incomes by a measurable amount. For others who do not need or do not 
want income, charitable service is a career. There are many “professional” vol-
unteers. In any event, whatever services one performs for a charity as a donor 
substitute for services for which the charity otherwise might pay. Just as one 
values goods at their resale value, charities could value services at their market 
substitute value. No one would seriously argue that the services a doctor per-
forms as a volunteer seeing patients in a charitable clinic without compensa-
tion are less valuable or of no value because of the absence of compensation. 
Services are rarely if ever without value.
Some may argue that monetizing service contributions diminishes them. 
Service donors wish recognition for their service not the money value of their 
service. Monetizing, however, is consistent with current practice for cash and 
property donations and might enhance, rather than diminish, the perception 
of the services’ importance to the organization. We measure value in money. 
The other donative participants in the charitable process, the monetary 
donors, tend to trivialize volunteer services of those who are not major deci-
sion makers, especially those at the lower end of the work spectrum. Mon-
etary donors might not trivialize those service donations quite so much if the 
organization did monetize the service donations and give them equal status 
with monetary donations. But to avoid diminution, charitable organizations 
151 See Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a 
Problem of Fiscal Policy 53 (1938) (a work establishing the most commonly cited compre-
hensive income definition emphasizing the difficulty of valuing leisure with the example of the 
Flugeladjutant who gets opera tickets but hates opera).
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could establish separate (but equally valid) contribution categories based 
upon time commitments and significant recognition opportunities alongside 
their monetary contribution categories.
VIII.  Conclusion
As a class, service donors, especially those who spend much of their time 
as charitable volunteers, historically have demonstrated strong commitment 
to the organizations they serve.152 They have literal as well as figurative “skin 
in the game.” Development professionals for charitable organizations actively 
ought to recruit committed volunteers who might need just a little periodic 
encouragement to continue to serve rather than fickle financial donors who 
the organization must constantly woo. Experience also reveals that indi-
viduals who commit substantial time and energy to an organization tend 
to remember the organization in their wills.153 While job opportunities and 
career paths within the charitable sector are appealing, the professionalization 
of charitable occupation regrettably must alter—possibly de-radicalize—the 
commitment to the charitable cause. Recognition of the value of service con-
tributions might stem this trend and reinvigorate the American traditions of 
volunteerism and service while it affords less wealthy individuals opportuni-
ties to redirect government revenues to their favored charitable causes just as 
more wealthy individuals do currently with their gifts of some of their surplus 
money and appreciated property.
152 See Ram A. Cnaan & Toni Cascio, Performance and Commitment: Issues in Management 
of Volunteers in Human Service Organizations, 24 J. Soc. Service Res. 1, 9 (1998) (volunteers 
who are committed to an organization’s cause are more likely to remain actively involved with 
the organization).
153 See Paul G. Schervish et al., Charitable Giving: How Much, By Whom, To What, and How? 
in The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook 545, 550 (Walter Powell et al. eds., 
2006) (observing that important predictor of charitable giving is continued participation in 
an organization).
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